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Abstract. Many firms try to leverage consumers’ interactions on social platforms as part of
their communication strategies. However, information on online social networks only
propagates if it receives consumers’ attention. This paper proposes a seeding strategy to
maximize information propagation while accounting for competition for attention. The
theory of exchange networks serves as the framework for identifying the optimal seeding
strategy and recommends seeding people that havemany friends, who, in turn, have only a
few friends. There is little competition for the attention of those seeds’ friends, and these
friends are therefore responsive to the messages they receive. Using a game-theoretic
model, we show that it is optimal to seed people with the highest Bonacich centrality.
Importantly, in contrast to previous seeding literature that assumed a fixed and non-
negative connectivity parameter of the Bonacich measure, we demonstrate that this
connectivity parameter is negative and needs to be estimated. Two independent empirical
validations using a total of 34 social media campaigns on two different large online social
networks show that the proposed seeding strategy can substantially increase a campaign’s
reach. The second study uses the activity network of messages exchanged to confirm that
the effects are driven by competition for attention.
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1. Introduction
In the last decade, a growing number of companies
and organizations have initiated marketing campaigns
leveraging online social interactions. In 2014, the First
Kiss video by the clothing brandWren gathered more
than 42 million YouTube views in three days1 and
increased sales by nearly 14,000%.2 Other well-known
examples of successful campaigns are the 2013 Dove
Real Beauty Sketches video, which gathered more than
114 million views within one month,3 and the 2012
Kony video bringing criminal issues in Africa to the
attention of the public. Watching such messages in-
creases people’s engagement with products and brands,
which, in turn, increases their profitability for the firm
(Rishika et al. 2013, Kumar et al. 2016), especially
when many people are reached. However, in many
situations, information does not spread easily on
social networks (Sun et al. 2009, Bakshy et al. 2011,
Feng et al. 2015), resulting in only a few campaigns that
go truly viral (Watts and Peretti 2007, Goel et al. 2012).
The enormous amount of information that is shared
on social networks is an important explanation for
whymost campaigns do not go viral (Asur et al. 2011,
Berger and Milkman 2012, Weng et al. 2012). Users
can pay attention to only a subset of all the infor-
mation they receive, and the more they receive, the
less likely it is that they will pay attention to any
specific message.
To initiate a campaign that reaches many people, a
firm first needs to define a seeding strategy. A seeding
strategy involves the identification of a small number
of key individuals that maximizes the reach in the so-
cial network (Hinz et al. 2011, Aral and Dhillon 2018).
Several recent studies deal with identifying these
key individuals, in the context of both informa-
tion propagation (e.g., Yoganarasimhan 2012, Goel
et al. 2016, Chen et al. 2017) and new-product adop-
tion (e.g., Bakshy et al. 2009, Goldenberg et al. 2009,
Katona et al. 2011, Aral et al. 2013). As argued by
Centola (2010), an essential distinction between
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information propagation and new-product adoption is
that information propagation tends to follow a simple
process in which one individual is sufficient to pass
information on, typically modeled by using a cascade
model (Aral and Dhillon 2018). In contrast, product
adoption is more complex because it is influenced by
other factors, such as prices and network externali-
ties, and it often requires information of multiple
connections to reinforce adoption decisions (Aral and
Walker 2011, Iyengar et al. 2011, Aral et al. 2013, Aral
and Dhillon 2018). Our research deals with infor-
mation propagation and thus contributes to the
seeding literature on “simple” processes that require
limited reinforcement. Empirical studies in this litera-
ture highlight the importance of seedingwell-connected
network members, because they are able to reach many
individuals quickly (Hinz et al. 2011, Chen et al. 2017).
However, effective seeds not only have many friends,
but their friends should also be susceptible to in-
coming information (Watts andDodds 2007, Aral and
Dhillon 2018). Using randomized experiments on
large social networks, Aral and Walker (2012) were
able to measure susceptibility and influence of net-
workmembers and demonstrated their importance in
propagation processes. However, they did not con-
sider how this affects optimal seeding strategies and
called for future research to examine this. Our re-
search aims to take the next step into this policy-
relevant stream of research by deriving the optimal
seeding strategy considering competition for atten-
tion as a facet of susceptibility. Individuals who re-
ceive many messages face stronger competition for
attention and are therefore less likely to attend to a
specific message and subsequently forward it (Asur
et al. 2011, Weng et al. 2012, Iyer and Katona 2016).
Moreover, because highly connected individuals re-
ceive, on average, more information (Aral and Van
Alstyne 2011, Bapna andUmyarov 2015), competition
for attention and, thus susceptibility, depends on
network position.
To derive the optimal seeding strategy under com-
petition for attention, we build on exchange-network
theory that deals with competition in networks (Cook
et al. 1983, Markovsky et al. 1988, Yamagishi et al.
1988, Blume et al. 2009). In exchange networks where
scarce goods are traded, the most powerful members
are those who have many potential trading partners
but whose trading partners have only a few alter-
native trading partners. Analogously, in this paper,
we argue that social network members who have
many friends4 but whose friends have only few
friends are able to obtain a high reach. Such network
members are effective seeds because there is low
competition for their friends’ attention, and these
friends therefore have a higher likelihood to further
share the information they receive. Although exchange-
network theory explicitly addressed such competition,
this notion has been neglected in the seeding literature.
We show that competition for attention has strong im-
plications for the effectiveness of seeding strategies.
Our research aims to contribute in threeways. First,
although previous research has considered compe-
tition for attention in online social networks (Weng
et al. 2012), the implications for seeding strategies
were not well understood. We are the first to derive
an optimal seeding strategy under competition for
attention and find that optimal seeding is achieved
using the Bonacich centrality measure (Bonacich
1987) in which the connectivity parameter β can be
negative. Second, previous empirical research on
seeding effectiveness only considered two restricted
special cases of Bonacich centrality: (1) degree cen-
trality (β = 0) and (2) eigenvalue centrality (β = inverse
of largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix). Our
paper is the first to propose that β can be negative and
that this parameter therefore needs to be estimated.
Third, in two empirical applications covering 34
different viral marketing campaigns on two social
network platforms, we show that β is indeed negative.
Taking into account negative values of β substantially
improves seeding effectiveness compared with al-
ternative seeding strategies, including the two special
cases of Bonacich centrality that have been applied in
the literature (i.e., degree centrality and eigenvalue
centrality). Moreover, in the second empirical appli-
cation, we observe the actual activities of network
members, which allows us to test our proposed un-
derlyingmechanism of competition for attention. Our
empirical results demonstrate the generalizability of
our theoretical predictions, which have important
practical implications for seeding.
We proceed as follows. First, we introduce our
conceptualmodel and explain hownetworkmembers
who maximize information propagation can be iden-
tified. Using a game-theoretic model, we analytically
derive the optimal seeding strategy. We validate the
strategy in two independent empirical studies. In Study
1, we show that seeds with many friends, who, in turn,
have few friends, on average, obtain a higher reach. An
out-of-sample comparison demonstrates the substan-
tial gains that can be achieved by applying the optimal
seeding strategy derived from the theoretical model.
Study 2 generalizes our findings from Study 1 for an
additional 33 campaigns on a different social network
and illustrates the mechanism of competition for at-
tention. We conclude with a discussion of the main in-
sights our research offers, their implications for seeding
social media campaigns, and future research directions
on the importance of competition for attention in online
social networks.
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2. Identifying Effective Seeds
A social media campaign starts with a company
communicating a marketing message to (potential)
customers, who may subsequently share the message
with their friends on the social network, after which a
repetitive sharing or viral process evolves (Bampo
et al. 2008, De Bruyn and Lilien 2008, van der Lans
et al. 2010). A campaign that successfully creates such
a viral effect reaches many people after initially
seeding only a few individuals in a network (Hinz
et al. 2011, Aral and Dhillon 2018). To achieve this
goal, it is important to understand which factors in-
fluence the information-propagation process, as graph-
ically illustrated in Figure 1. First, the propagation
process is driven by a firm’s seeding strategy—that
is, whom and how many network members to seed.
Second, the propagation process is influenced by the
properties of the network. Although previous seeding
literaturemostly focusedon the role of network structure,
summarized by centrality measures such as degree and
eigenvector centrality (e.g., Hinz et al. 2011, Banerjee
et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2017), it did not consider
network connectivity and how information may
compete for attention. We contribute to this literature
by explicitly taking such competition for attention into
account. We study how it affects sharing and derive
implications for optimizing a firm’s seeding strategy.
As illustrated in Figure 1, the firm’s seeding strategy
plays a crucial role in the propagation process of a
social media campaign and, as a consequence, in the
campaign’s reach. Previous seeding research there-
fore tried to understand which members of a social
network are important candidates to target in the
seeding strategy (Hinz et al. 2011, Aral et al. 2013,
Banerjee et al. 2013, Banerjee et al. 2019, Chen et al.
2017). This research has identified two network prop-
erties that contribute to information propagation
(Libai et al. 2013). First, network members with many
connections are more important because being highly
connected enables them to contactmany people directly
(Goldenberg et al. 2009), and being highly connected
may increase their influence through status (Hu and
Vanden Bulte 2014, Lanz et al. 2019). Second, network
members occupying a strategic network position,
such as bridges connecting two subnetworks, are
important for spreading information beyond local
communities (Granovetter 1973, Burt 1997, Burt 2004,
Tucker 2008, Valente 2012). These studies, however,
do not investigate whether the responsiveness of
receivers of campaign messages depends on their
network positions, even though the receivers’ re-
sponsiveness to new information is an important
determinant of information propagation and product-
adoption processes (Iyengar et al. 2011, Aral and
Walker 2012, Ugander et al. 2012, Aral et al. 2013,
Aral andWalker 2014). In this research, we propose a
seeding strategy that considers both the connected-
ness of individuals and the attention and respon-
siveness of their friends, as we discuss next.
2.1. Competition for Attention in Social Networks
Consumers’ attentional resources are limited and
have been referred to as “the scarcest resource in
today’s business” (Pieters andWedel 2004 p.36).With
the growth of shared information on the web and
on social networks, competition for attention has
greatly increased in the last decade. As a conse-
quence, gaining consumer attention is crucial for the
success of marketing campaigns (Pieters et al. 2007,
van der Lans et al. 2008). As illustrated by Berger and
Milkman (2012), the location of news articles on the
New York Times web page significantly influences the
number of times such articles are shared. News ar-
ticles that attract more attention, such as the ones
presented on the top of a web page, are shared more
often—even after controlling for content, complex-
ity, and other article characteristics. Thus, although
popularity remains hard to predict (Salganik et al.
2006), gaining consumer attention is crucial for the
propagation of information.
Using an agent-based model, Weng et al. (2012)
illustrated that heterogeneity in the virality of different
Figure 1. Theoretical Framework
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messages on Twitter can be explained by only two
factors: (1) competition for our limited attention and
(2) the structure of the social network. Other factors,
such as the appeal of the message content, the per-
suasiveness of an individual, and external events,were
not necessary to derive the observed empirical pat-
terns on Twitter. Competition for attention also ex-
plains the fact that a small proportion of individuals is
responsible for most of the information shared on
social networks (Iyer and Katona 2016) and the
power-law distribution of trending topics on Twitter
(Asur et al. 2011). Similarly, competition for attention
is an important explanatory factor for the popularity
of stories on digg.com (Wu and Huberman 2007).
All these studies stress the importance of taking
competition for attention into account when deter-
mining which individuals are critical for information
propagation on social networks. Individuals with
many friends are likely to receive more information,
and hence, there is more competition for their at-
tention (Feng et al. 2015). Thus, for seeding decisions,
it is important to take into account how many friends
a potential seed has and how many friends these
friends have. The latter has a direct impact on the
attention of the seeds’ friends and thus on the
competition for it. These two aspects of information
propagation are related to negatively connected net-
works, as proposed in exchange-network theory.
Exchange-network theory allows us to combine the
ideas of obtaining a high reach as a result of having
many friends and being surrounded by responsive
friends because they receive relatively little com-
peting information.
2.2. Positively and Negatively Connected
Social Networks
According to exchange-network theory (Cook 1982,
Cook et al. 1983), networks are either positively or
negatively connected depending on whether exchange
in one relationship affects exchange in other relation-
ships positively or negatively (Yamagishi et al. 1988).
In a positively connected network, exchange in one
relationship is contingent on exchange in another
relationship. Networks of brokerage are an example
of positively connected networks. In such networks,
exchange between buyers and brokers is contingent
on exchange between brokers and sellers. However,
as argued by Cook et al. (1983), networks with only
positive connections are probably rare. In a nega-
tively connected network, exchange in one relation-
ship is contingent on nonexchange in another relation-
ship. There is competition between the contacts of
each network member. A dating network, for example,
is strongly negatively connected (Bearman et al. 2004)
because exchange in one relationship inhibits ex-
change in another relationship.
Althoughwe study information propagation rather
than exchange, online social networks can also be
positively or negatively connected. Whether they are
positively or negatively connected has not been ad-
dressed in the literature yet and remains an empirical
question. People share many types of information
with their friends on online social networks, such as
status updates, pictures, links to external web pages,
andmarketingmessages.We expect that online social
networks are negatively connected because people
have limited mental resources and bandwidth to
process information (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011).
Hence, messages are competing for attention. Next,
we describe how the framework of positively versus
negatively connected networks can be applied in
the context of information propagation in order to
identify effective seeds who can obtain a high reach.
2.3. Who to Seed in Positively vs. Negatively
Connected Networks?
To identify effective seeds as a function of network
structure and connectivity, we develop a network
game. Network games are powerful tools to model
strategic behavior and to identify the most important
network members (Jackson 2008, Lobel et al. 2016).
To identify which network members can obtain the
highest reach in both positively and negatively con-
nected networks, we build on the network game of
Ballester et al. (2006). Our network game contains N
individuals connected in a social network that is
represented by adjacency matrix A. This is an N × N
matrix,5 with aij = 1 if the information that individ-
ual i shares is received by individual j—that is, j
“follows” i—and aij = 0 otherwise or when i = j. Sim-
ilar to members of social networks such as Facebook,
LinkedIn, Instagram, Twitter, and Weibo, individuals
in the network share content with their friends (undi-
rected networks) or followers (directed networks). The
shared content consists of both newly generated mes-
sages (e.g., a family picture) and passing on existing
messages (e.g., a campaign message). The more active
network members are—that is, the more messages
they share—the more information will propagate.
Each networkmember i derives utility ui from sharing
depending on his or her sharing rate, represented by xi.
The sharing rate can be interpreted as the number of
messages shared within a given time interval. Fol-
lowing Ballester et al. (2006), we define the utility of
sharing as follows:
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In Equation (1), we assume that α > 0 to capture de-
creasing marginal returns of sharing. To capture
competition for attention, we follow Aral and Van
Alstyne (2011) and allow that individuals have a
capacity constraint on listening to and sharing in-
formation. Given the capacity constraint, the more
messages an individual receives, the less likely he or
she is able to attend to any specific message, process
it, and, subsequently share it. This effect can be cap-
tured by negative cross-effects (β < 0) between the re-
ceived messages
∑n
j1ajixj and the shared messages xi.
By contrast, if cross-effects are positive (β > 0), some-
one’s capacity to process information increases as the
number of messages received increases. Such com-
plementarity effects may occur when sharing mes-
sages is more enjoyable if someone’s friends or the
people he or she follows also actively share messages
(Lin and Lu 2011).
Because of the linear-quadratic specification of the
utility function, network members have a unique shar-
ing rate that maximizes their utility. In matrix notation,
the first-order condition of the game is given by
α1N − INx + βATx  0, (2)
where 1N is an N-dimensional vector of ones, IN is the
N × N identity matrix, AT is the transpose of the
adjacency matrix, and x is an N-dimensional vector
with sharing rates (x1, x2, . . . , xN). Solving for x, the






In equilibrium, it holds that




Equation (4) shows that the equilibrium sharing rate
of i is a linear function of the sum of the sharing rates
of everyone from whom i receives messages—that is,
i’s friends in an undirected network or the peoplewho
i follows in a directed network. In negatively (posi-
tively) connected networks in which β < 0 (β > 0), i’s
optimal sharing rate decreases (increases) with the
sharing rates of i’s friends (undirected network) or the
people i follows (directed network).
In a viral marketing campaign, the goal of the firm
is to seed those network members who are instru-
mental in maximizing the campaign’s reach (Bampo
et al. 2008, Kane et al. 2012). Hence, marketers aim at
choosing seeds who trigger interest in the campaign
among their friends or followers such that theywill, in
turn, share the campaign with their friends or fol-
lowers. To determine the optimal seeding strategy,
we extend the network game as follows. First, we
introduce the N-dimensional vector s, with si = 1 if
network member i is seeded and si = 0 otherwise. This
vector captures the unilateral seeding decision of the
firm. Second, seeded individuals receive one more
message, corresponding to the campaign message.
Third, following previous literature (Tang et al. 2014,
Aral and Dhillon 2018), we “assume that seeding is
‘successful’ at some basic level” (Aral et al. 2013,
p. 148), which implies that seeds share the campaign
message. In addition, we assume for now that only
one network member k is seeded such that sk = 1 and
si = 0 for all i ≠ k. Incorporating these assumptions
in Equation (1) leads to the following new utility
function for seeded network member k:




aikxi(xk + sk) + βsk(xk + sk). (5)
As seed k shares the campaign and othermessages, his
or her sharing rate consists of sharing noncampaign
messages and the campaign and thus can be written
as xk + sk. The last term of Equation (5), βsk(xk + sk),
captures how the sharing rate of the seed changes in
response to receiving the campaign from the firm. In a
positively connected network (β> 0), the seed derives
more utility from own sharing as he or she receives
additional information from the firm. In a negatively
connected network (β < 0), however, the seed derives
less utility from own sharing because he or she now
receives information from the firm in addition to the
messages received from network connections. Be-
cause the seed has limited capacity, his or her optimal
sharing rate in equilibrium will drop. The adjusted
sharing rate of the seedwill, in turn, affect the sharing
rate of other people in the network. In particular,
for all network members j who are not seeded but
who might be connected to seed k (j≠k), we extend
Equation (1) as follows:





aij(xi + si)xj. (6)
Equation (6) is equivalent to Equation (1), except that
when j is connected to seed k, j will receive the
campaign message, as captured by si, which equals 1
for i = k. Nonseeded network members choose their
sharing rates in response to the sharing rates of their
friends, treating noncampaign and campaign mes-
sages equally.
We can now combine utility functions for the seed
(Equation (5)) and nonseeds (Equation (6)) to arrive at
the utility function for any network member i.






xj + sj)(xi + si) + βsi(xi + si).
(7)
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Equation (7) holds for both seeds and nonseeds and for
any seeding strategy s, alsowhen seedingmore than one
network member. The firm’s seeding strategy disturbs
the equilibrium derived in Equation (3). The first-
order conditions of the new equilibrium are given by
α1N − IN(x + s) + βAT(x + s) + βs  0. (8)
The solution to this equation leads to the equilibrium
sharing rates of the network members under seeding
strategy s (see Appendix A).
x*(s)  x*(0)⏟⏞⏞⏟
Equilibriumwithout seeding
− (1 − β)s⏟̅̅⏞⏞̅̅⏟
Direct seeding effect
+ β2(IN − βAT)−1ATs⏟̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ⏞⏞̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅ ⏟
Indirect seeding effect
. (9)
The new equilibrium in Equation (9) consists of three
components. First, all network members adjust their
previous equilibrium sharing rate without seeding
x*(0)defined in Equation (3). Second, seeded network
members reduce their sharing rate for noncampaign
messages by (1 − β). Because of the capacity constraint
on listening and sharing, the sharing of one non-
campaign message is replaced by the campaign mes-
sage. In a negatively (positively) connected network,
this reduction is enhanced (attenuated) by β because
the campaign message competes for attention (com-
plements sharing) with noncampaign messages. Third,
sharing rates are affected indirectly in response to the
adjustment of the seeds’ sharing rates. This indirectly
affects all network members, both seeded and non-
seeded, who adjust their sharing efforts by β2(IN −
βAT)−1ATs. Under competition for attention, this is
a consequence of the reduction of the sharing rates of
seeds, leading to lower levels of competition for the
attention of nonseeded network members.
The goal of the firm is to optimize the campaign’s
reach by choosing seeding strategy s such that the
total sharing in the network is maximized. Because
the direct seeding effect does not depend on network
structure A, a firm only needs to consider the indi-
rect seeding effect (β2(IN − βA
T)−1ATs) when deciding
whom to seed. Given a predetermined seed size |s|,
the optimal seeding strategy s corresponds to maxi-














In Equation (10), 1TN corresponds to an N-row vector
(i.e., the transpose of 1N). Interestingly, the maximi-






ATs  sTβ2B(A, β), (11)
with B(A, β) representing the vector of Bonacich
centralities for each network member (Bonacich 1987).
B(A, β)  (IN − βA)−1A1N
 A1N + βA21N + β2A31N + β3A41N + . . . . (12)
Hence, the optimal seeding strategy is obtained when
firms sequentially—either using a roll-out strategy or
by selecting the seed size |s| a priori—target the seeds
with the highest Bonacich centrality.
To illustrate the optimal seeding strategy, we de-
termined the optimal seeding strategy in a simulated
undirected network of size N = 1,000. To ensure that
the simulated network has real-world properties,
such as a scale-free degree distribution, clustering,
and degree assortativity, we followed the method of
Sendiña-Nadal et al. (2016).6 We compared a posi-
tively and a negatively connected network (β = 0.05
and β = −0.05) and calculated the sum of the indirect
seeding effects in Equation (11) for the optimal seed-
ing strategy of targeting network members with the
highest Bonacich centrality. Figure 2 shows the indirect
seeding effect for different seed sizes, ranging from
seeding only one network member with the highest
Bonacich centrality to seeding all network members.
In both positively and negatively connected net-
works, the indirect seeding effect increases in seed
size. Importantly, for a given seed size, the indirect
seeding effect is always larger in a positively than in a
negatively connected network. Firms operating on a
negatively connected network thus have to increase
their efforts in terms of seed size to achieve the same
network activation as firms operating on a positively
connected network. This is in line with our proposed
mechanism of competition for attention hindering
information sharing in a negatively connected network.
Figure 2. Indirect Seeding Effect as a Function of Seed Size
in Positively Connected (β = 0.05) and Negatively
Connected (β = −0.05) Networks
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2.4. Bonacich Centrality as a Measure for
Seed Selection
As derived in the preceding section, optimal seeding
consists of selecting network members with the highest
Bonacich centrality, in both positively and negatively
connected networks. This centrality measure depends
on the connectivity parameter β of the social network
(Bonacich 1987). As can be seen in Equation (12), for
both positively and negatively connected networks,
B(A, β) increases in the number of friends a network
member has (i.e.,A1N). The difference between Bonacich
centrality in both types of networks is in how connected
someone’s friends are. In a positively connected net-
work, someone’s Bonacich centrality is high if his or
her friends also have many friends (i.e., A21N is
large7), and this quickly leads to a higher reach of
network members. In a negatively connected net-
work, someone’s Bonacich centrality is high if his or
her many friends have only a few friends (i.e., A21N is
small), meaning that there is little competition for the
attention of these friends, which in this case will fa-
cilitate reach. To illustrate this, consider the undi-
rected network presented in Figure 3. In this network,
we highlighted four individuals, A–D. These four
individuals have an equal number of friends, but their
friends (i.e., A1, A2, B1, B2, etc.) differ with respect to
the number of their friends. Suppose that a marketer
is initiating a social media campaign and considers
individual A, B, C, or D as a potential seed. If the
network is positively connected, the marketer should
consider people who are connected to as many other
people as possible in just a few steps. In such a case,
seeding individual A would be the best option—the
message could then quickly spread to more network
members than if it was seeded to B, C, or D. However,
in a negatively connected network, the friends of
A are more prone to information overload because
they potentially receive more information than the
friends of B, C, and D. Individual A therefore might
not be the most effective one to seed. Individual A’s
friends may be receiving many competing messages
and thus may be less likely to pay attention to and
share the message received from A. In this situation,
individual B, C, or D may be a better candidates for
seeding.
Although special cases of the Bonacich centrality
measure have appeared in the recent seeding litera-
ture, previous research, to the best of our knowledge,
determined the value of β a priori, and no research has
considered negative values. If β = 0, Equation (12)
corresponds to (out)degree centrality, which is themost
frequently used centrality measure in research in mar-
keting on social networks (Tucker 2008, Goldenberg
et al. 2009, Lee et al. 2010, Trusov et al. 2010, Ansari
et al. 2011, Aral and Walker 2011, Braun and Bonfrer
2011, Hinz et al. 2011, Iyengar et al. 2011, Katona et al.
2011, Zubcsek and Sarvary 2011, Yoganarasimhan
2012). Furthermore, if β is set equal to the inverse
of the largest eigenvalue of adjacency matrix A, it
corresponds to eigenvector centrality, a centrality
measure in a positively connected network. Tucker
(2008) and Chen et al. (2017) have examined eigen-
vector centrality and concluded that it performs worse
than degree centrality in explaining technology adop-
tion and information propagation, respectively.
Although a seeding strategy based on Bonacich
centrality is theoretically optimal, a practical limita-
tion of this measure is that it requires observing the
entire social network (see Equation (12)). This is in-
feasible in many situations because businesses run-
ning social media campaigns usually do not observe
the entire network. We therefore propose a truncated
version of the Bonacich centrality measure for prac-
tical seeding purposes, which is defined as follows:
TB(A, β)  A1N + βA21N . (13)
This approximation captures the idea that both own
and friends’ degrees matter. Moreover, because β is
typically a very small number (Bonacich 1987), the
higher-order terms in Equation (12) get a very small
weight and thus are less important. The approxi-
mation in Equation (13) has two important advan-
tages over the original definition. First, it has more
practical use because it does not require observing the
complete network. Given an initial set of network
members—for example, based on Facebook likes or
Twitter followers—data on first and second degree
can easily be obtained by navigating the network
(Kane et al. 2012, van Dam and van de Velden 2015).
Figure 3. Illustrative Artificial Social Network
Note. The sign indicates that there may exist more network con-
nections than presented here.
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Second, the implementation in Equation (13) allows
for a more straightforward estimation procedure of β
because Equation (12) involves an infinite sum or a
large matrix inversion, which is generally more dif-
ficult to estimate.8
3. Study 1: Optimal Seeding, an Empirical
Validation Based on a Social Media
Game Campaign
We validate our proposed optimal seeding strategy
by analyzing a real-life social media campaign on a
large online social network platform. This campaign
involved an online bowling game and was initiated
by an entertainment company to promote the launch
of an animated movie. The game was developed
specifically for this purpose andwas similar to Angry
Birds.9 In the game, the gamer shoots a ball and aims
at hitting bowling skittles. To seed the social media
campaign, the entertainment company did not select
specific network members strategically but posted a
banner visible to all members betweenMay 25 and 31,
2009. Network members who clicked on the banner
connected to the campaign website, where they could
play the game. After playing the game, participants
were offered the opportunity to select friends with
whom to share the campaign by challenging them
also to play the game. After sharing, the receivers
could click on the link in the invitation received from
their friends, which also connected them to the cam-
paignwebsite, where they could play the game. These
participants could then, in turn, select with whom to
share the campaign among their friends and so forth.
The company recorded time-stamped information on
who accessed the campaign website and who shared
with whom. By visiting the campaign website, par-
ticipants permitted the entertainment company to
access information on their own and on their friends’
social network profiles. In our analysis, we identify
initial participants who clicked on the banner as seeds.
3.1. Network, Campaign, and Seed
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics of the undirected network, the
campaign, and the seeds are presented in Table 1. We
have profile information for more than 4 million
network members, which constitute more than half
the total estimated 7 million social network members
at the time of the campaign. The observed network
members had a strongly right-skewed degree dis-
tribution (mean degree =158.3, standard deviation
(SD) = 398.7), consisted of relatively young members
(mean age = 26.0, SD = 16.0), with slightly more
women (56%) thanmen (44%). Several of the observed
network members (20%) had not disclosed personal
information on either age or gender. We recorded this
in a missingness dummy, which takes the value one
if the information on age or gender is missing and
zero otherwise.
Figure 4 summarizes the spread of the social media
campaign over time. The banner was available during
the first seven days of the campaign. We observed a
sharp drop in the number of campaign participants
once the banner was removed. The sharing pro-
cess continued for 11 more days, during which the
number of shares gradually declined. Throughout the
forwarding chains, the campaign reached a total of
Table 1. Study 1 Descriptive Statistics
Total Mean Standard deviation
Network statistics
Number of network members observed 4,002,033
Degree 158.3 398.7
Age (based on complete observations) 26.0 16.0
Gender (male = 1, female = 0, based on complete observations) 0.44 0.50
Missingness dummy 0.20 0.40
Degree assortativity 0.04
Campaign statistics
Time period of seeding (days) 7
Number of days active spreading 18
Total number of people reached by the campaign 188,303
Seed statistics
Number of seeds 71,501
Number of seeds sharing the campaign 5,028
Number of friends shared with | sharing 19.1 35.4
Reach | sharing 32.4 72.3
Degree 145.2 193.7
Second degree 252,669 509,220
Age (based on complete observations) 21.9 25.3
Gender (male = 1, female = 0, based on complete observations) 0.53 0.49
Missingness dummy 0.15 0.36
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188,303 participants. Among these, 71,501 network
members clicked on the banner—we call these the
seeds—and 116,802 were invited by friends.
Of the 71,501 seeds, a total of 5,028 shared the
campaign with their friends, corresponding to 7.03%
sharing. The average number of friends shared with
(Mi), conditional on sharing, was 19.1 (SD = 35.4).
However, as illustrated in Figure 5, the distribution of
Mi is heavily skewed. To compute the reach (Ri) that a
seed i obtained, we counted the number of network
members in the cascade that he or she initiated. The
average reach conditional on sharing is 32.4, but the
distribution is again heavily skewed (SD = 72.3). The
seeds have an average degree of 145.2 (SD = 193.7)
and an average second-order degree of 252,669 (SD =
509,220). The high second-order degree relative to the
first-order degree is in line with the friendship par-
adox (Feld 1991), which states that most people have
fewer friends than their friends have. Regarding
demographics, the seeds are, on average, 21.9 years
old (SD = 25.3) and are about equally divided among
men (53%) and women (47%). About 15% of the seeds
opted not to disclose age or gender information. For
our model estimation, we have mean imputed age for
those profiles, where the mean is computed based on
the complete observations, andwe have used an effect
coding for gender: −1 for female, 1 for male, and 0 if
the information on gender is missing.
Figure 4. Study 1: Spread of the Viral Marketing Campaign over Time
Figure 5. Study 1: Number of Messages Sent by Seeds as a Function of Their Degree
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3.2. Model Formulation
In the first stage of a social media campaign, a
company communicates a marketing message to so-
cial network members. When confronted with this
message, a seeded network member decides whether
to share the message with friends. Once a decision to
share is made, he or she needs to choose how many
friends with whom to share. In the campaign we
analyzed, the vast majority of seeded network mem-
bers who received a message from the company did
not share, aswillmost likely be the case formost social
media campaigns (Goel et al. 2012). Therefore, in
modeling the sharing decision and reach, we used a
hurdle model, which accounts for the excess zeroes in
the data. This modeling approach is based on Hinz
et al. (2011). However, Hinz et al. (2011) used inde-
pendentmodels for the sharing, the number of friends
shared with, and the reach obtained and thus as-
sumed that these are independent decisions. We ex-
tend their approach and model these decisions si-
multaneouslybyallowing for a correlated error structure.
Our approach controls for sample selection because
someone may decide to share a message only if he or
she believes that the information is useful for his or her
friends (Berger andMilkman 2012) and, hence, obtains
a higher reach. If not properly accounted for, sample
selection may lead to biased parameter estimates.
For each seed i, let Di denote whether i shares or
not—that is,Di = 1 if i shares andDi = 0 otherwise. We
model the decision variable Di using a probit model
with latent variable vi such that
vi  a1 + b1Degreei + γ1Zi + ε1i, (14)
and Di = 1 if and only if vi > 0. The vector Zi contains
the control variables age and gender and the miss-
ingness dummy.
Following exchange-network theory and the net-
work game, network members with high degree tend
to receive more messages, and there is thus more
competition for their attention. Hence, we expect a
negative value for b1. This is also in line with the
assumptions of Bakshy et al. (2011), who suggest that
seeding high-degree individuals is costlier because it
is more difficult to convince these individuals to share
information. In contrast, Hinz et al. (2011) find that
high-degree individuals have a higher probability to
share a marketing message. However, in their study,
individuals received a monetary incentive to share
information—that is, free airtime for a mobile service.
Because degree centrality in their study was mea-
sured by the number of phone calls to other indi-
viduals, customerswith high-degree centrality derive
higher benefits from sharing (free airtime).
After deciding to share, seed i chooses how many
friends with whom to share, denoted by Mi, which







where q is the overdispersion parameter, and λi is the
expectation of Mi conditional on the covariates
λi  exp a2 + b2Degreei + γ2Zi + ε2i
( )
. (16)
The zero-truncated negative binomial distribution
accounts for overdispersion and for the fact that the
number of shared messages is always positive, con-
ditional on the sharing decision in Equation (14). We
expect a positive value of b2 because high-degree
individuals generally have more friends with whom
to share the message.
The effectiveness of the seeds is measured by their
reach Ri, defined as the number of network members
who receive the message in the cascade initiated by
seed i. We use the number of friends shared with Mi
and the truncated Bonacich centrality TBi(A, β) as
predictors of reach. We model reach using a zero-
truncated negative binomial distribution
Ri ~TruncNB µi, r
( )
, (17)
where r is the overdispersion parameter, and µi is the
expectation of Ri conditional on the covariates
µi  exp a3 + b3TBi A, β
( ) + d3Mi + γ3Zi + ε3i( ). (18)
Following our theoretical model, we expect a positive
effect of Bonacich centrality on reach after controlling
for the number of shares Mi, which corresponds to
b3 > 0. The more friends someone shares with, the
higher is the expected reach, so we expect that d3 > 0.
In the estimation, we recast Equation (18) as





with β = b4/b3.
Because the seeds decide themselves whether to
share the campaign message, we need to account for
self-selection in Equations (15) and (17). Therefore,we
use a correlated error structure between the error


















In Equation (20), we set σ11 = 1 for identification
purposes of the probit part of the model.
3.3. Model Estimation
Because the error terms of the three model equations
(Equations (14), (16), and (19)) are correlated, we use a
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joint maximum-likelihood procedure that simulta-
neously estimates all model parameters. To derive the
model likelihood, we first partition Σ as follows for
notational convenience:
Σ
1 | σ12 σ13
− | − −
σ12 | σ22 σ23








The conditional distribution of ε1i, given ε2i and ε3i, is
then given by











The conditional probability of sharing can be writ-
ten as
Pr(Di  1|ε2i, ε3i)  Φ
(




 Φ*i , (23)
where Φ(.) is the standard normal probability func-
tion. The conditional likelihood contribution of ob-
servation i is given by
+i(θ|ε2i, ε3i)  1 − Φ*i
( )(1−Di)






where θ is the parameter vector collecting {a1, a2, a3,
b1, b2, b3, b4, d3, γ1, γ2, γ3, q, r, Σ}, fTNB(Mi; λi, q)
is the density function of truncated negative bino-
mial distribution
fTNB Mi;λi, q
( )  λMii
Mi!
Γ q +Mi( )
Γ q
( )





and similarly for fTNB(Ri; µi, r). The unconditional




+i(θ|ε2i, ε3i)g(ε2i, ε3i)dε2idε3i, (26)
where g(ε2i, ε3i) is the joint density function of ε2i
and ε3i.
Because the likelihood function in Equation (26)
does not have a closed-form solution for θ, we apply
numerical integration. To reduce computational costs
in evaluating the double integrant, we use sparse
grids, as proposed by Heiss and Winschel (2008).
Likelihood approximation based on sparse grids is
computationally less demanding than a simulated
maximum-likelihood approach. Confidence intervals
of all elements of θ are obtained by using 1,000
bootstrap samples (Efron 1985).
3.4. Results
In addition to the full model, in which we estimated
all parameters, including the network connectivity
parameter β and the full covariance matrix Σ, we also
estimated four benchmark models. The first bench-
mark model neglects network structure and only
includes the demographic variables age and gender
and the control variable for missingness. In the sec-
ond benchmark model, we include degree centrality,
which is the most common network measure in the
previous literature. This is equivalent to setting the
network connectivity parameter β equal to zero and
does not take competition for attention into account.
The third benchmark model includes a proxy for ei-
genvector centrality,10 the centrality measure in a
positively connected network. The fourth benchmark
model includes all the covariates of the full model
but does not account for sample selection bias. We
computed the approximated log-likelihood andBayesian
information criterion (BIC) for all five models to de-
termine which model best describes the underlying
process of the social media campaign (Table 2).
Table 2 presents the estimation results and model-
fit statistics (log likelihood and BIC) of the four bench-
mark models and the full model. Compared with the
model without network information (benchmark 1),
including degree centrality (benchmark 2) significantly
improves model fit, which is in line with previous re-
search (Hinz et al. 2011). However, assuming a pos-
itively connected network reduces model fit because
this measure is not related to reach (benchmark 3).
Moreover, controlling for selection bias is important
because restricting covariances between the three
equations to zero significantly reduces model fit (bench-
mark 4). The estimation results show that our fullmodel
outperforms all benchmarks in terms of both the ap-
proximated log-likelihood and BIC.
Because signs of parameters do not differ across the
five models, we interpret only the results of the full
model (last two columns in Table 2) in the remainder
of this section. A key finding of this research is that the
estimated network connectivity parameter β is neg-
ative ( β̂  b̂4/b̂3 = −0.927 × 10−5) and significant at the
95% level across the bootstrap samples. Thus, as we
argued earlier, network members who have many
friends ( b̂3 = 1.200× 10−3) butwhose friends have only
few friends (b̂4 = −1.112 × 10−8) are able to obtain the
highest reach.11 In addition, following the expecta-
tions in a negatively connected network, we find in
Equation (14) that degree has a significant negative
effect on the probability of sharing (b̂1 = −0.437 × 10−3).
Although high-degree network members have a
lower probability of sharing, as we expected, these
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individuals share significantlymoremessageswith their
friends once they do decide to share (b̂2 = 0.281 × 10−3).
These results support the mechanism that social me-
dia messages compete for the attention of social net-
work members. First, network members with many
connections are less likely to respond to messages re-
ceived from an advertiser. Second, these network mem-
bers are also less likely to respond to messages received
from their friends, as indicated by the negative network
connection parameter β.
In addition to the strong effects of degree and
second-order degree, we find that older people are
more likely to share, share with more friends, and
obtain a higher reach. We also find that for this
specific campaign, men are less likely to share, and if
they share, they share with fewer friends and obtain a
lower reach. This is different from earlier findings by
Hinz et al. (2011), who report that in the context of
mobile phone subscriptions, men are more likely to
share a campaign message. However, in general, we
can expect gender differences in sharing behavior to
be campaign specific (Phillip and Suri 2004). Finally,
individuals with missing profile data are less likely to
share, tend to share with fewer friends, and obtain a
lower reach when they share. This confirms earlier
findings on privacy concerns by Goldfarb and Tucker
(2011) or indicates that these network members are
simply less active in general.
3.5. Out-of-Sample Counterfactual Comparison of
Seeding Strategies
To compare the potential reach of different seeding
strategies, we conducted an out-of-sample comparison.
All the seeding strategies that we compare include
personal characteristics of the networkmembers, which
are typically observed by firms. In particular, we com-
pare the expected reach of the campaign when using
seeding strategies based on personal characteristics
(i.e., age, gender, and missing profile information; i.e.,
benchmark 1) and seeding strategies that take into










Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
Sharing (Equation (14))
Intercept −1.550 *** −1.381 *** −1.303 *** −1.404 *** −1.735 ***
Degree × 10−3 −0.689 *** −0.571 *** −0.604 *** −0.437 ***
Age 0.012 ** 0.010 ** 0.009 ** 0.011 *** 0.016 **
Male −0.143 *** −0.133 *** −0.115 *** −0.132 *** −0.114 ***
Missingness dummy −0.090 *** −0.094 *** −0.105 *** −0.090 *** −0.140 ***
Number of friends shared with (Mi) (Equation (19))
Intercept 1.174 *** 1.224 *** 2.973 *** 2.630 *** 2.508 ***
Degree × 10−3 0.272 *** 0.182 *** 2.077 *** 0.281 ***
Age 0.001 0.001 0.016 ** 0.001 ** 0.002 *
Male −0.013 ** −0.010 ** −0.007 ** −0.082 *** −0.011 *
Missingness dummy −0.130 *** −0.158 *** −0.295 *** −0.123 * −0.212 ***
Reach (Ri) (Equation (16))
Intercept 1.590 *** 1.632 *** 2.504 *** 1.963 *** 1.756 ***
Degree × 10−3 0.178 ** 1.602 *** 1.200 **
Second degree × 10−8 −1.758 *** −1.112 **
Eigenvector centrality −0.001
Mi × 10−2 4.501 *** 4.691 *** 3.529 *** 3.788 *** 0.049 ***
Age 0.012 ** 0.013 ** 0.023 *** 0.013 *** 0.004 **
Male −0.073 ** −0.130 ** −0.195 *** −0.090 *** −0.055 *
Missingness dummy −0.107 *** −0.072 *** −0.054 ** −0.136 ** −0.063 ***
Network connectivity (β × 10−5) 0 Fixed 0.927 Fixed −1.097 *** −0.927 **
Covariance matrix (Equation (20))
Sigma 12 0.025 0.009 −0.733 −0.094
Sigma 13 −0.276 * −0.190 * −0.260 * −0.256 *
Sigma 23 0.191 ** 0.082 ** 0.042 ** 0.003 *
Sigma 22 0.033 *** 0.008 *** 0.005 *** 0.010 ***
Sigma 33 1.123 *** 0.850 *** 0.975 *** 1.720 ***
LL −55,084 −54,962 −55,022 −57,635 −51,842
BIC 110,370 110,159 110,146 115,460 103,930
Note. Sig., significance level.
*The 90% confidence interval does not contain zero; **the 95% confidence interval does not contain zero; ***the 99% confidence interval does
not contain zero.
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account network information (i.e., first and second
degree and eigenvector centrality; i.e., benchmarks 2–4
and the full model).
We first randomly split the seeds in two samples, a
training sample thatwe used for estimating themodel
parameters and a holdout sample that we used for
comparing the effectiveness of seeding strategies.
Based on the parameters estimated by using the
training sample, we ranked all seeds in the holdout
sample according to their expected reach, as gener-
ated by each model. We repeated this procedure 100
times with different random splits. We then com-
puted the actual cumulative reach of the seeds as a
function of their rank in the holdout samples. The
results, averaged across the 100 random holdout
samples, are presented in Figure 6. The 45-degree line
in this figure represents the results for a random
seeding strategy, where each initial participant has
the same expected reach. As expected, the analytically
derived optimal seeding strategy within the network
game based on the estimated Bonacich centrality led
to the highest expected reach compared with all
benchmarkmodels. The vertical dashed line in Figure 6
compares the reach that is obtained by seeding the 10%
initial participants with the highest expected reach
following different seeding strategies. The reach ob-
tained by the optimal seeding strategy is 4.2 times the
reach obtained by random seeding, 2.2 times the reach
of benchmark 1 that only uses control variables, 1.7
times the reach of benchmark 2 that uses control vari-
ables and degree centrality, 1.7 times the reach of
benchmark 3 that uses control and eigenvector cen-
trality, and 1.8 times the reach based on benchmark 4
that does not control for the correlated error structure.
The total area under the seeding curve (AUC)12 of the
full model is 0.70, whereas it is only 0.65, 0.66, 0.64,
and 0.63, respectively, for benchmarks 1–4 (Table 3).
To further evaluate the predictive power of the models,
we also computed two out-of-sample prediction ac-
curacy measures, the mean absolute prediction error
(MAPE) and the root-mean-squared prediction error
(RMSPE), of the reach of each seed in the holdout
sample. The MAPE of the full model (3.3) is lower than
that of all benchmark models (respectively, 4.5, 3.6, 5.2,
and 3.5 for benchmarks 1–4). Also, the RMSPE of the
full model (17.7) is lower than that of all benchmark
models (respectively, 19.0, 18.8, 18.5, and 18.6 for
benchmarks 1–4).
In sum, our first empirical study on a large-scale
real-life social media campaign finds that the social
network is negatively connected and that the pro-
posed optimal seeding strategy, which accounts for
competition for attention, outperforms benchmark
seeding strategies by up to 70%depending on the seed
size. Although these empirical results confirm the
analytical results of Section 2, a number of concerns
exist. First, the data of Study 1 cover only a single
campaign on a single social network platform, lim-
iting the generalizability of our findings. Second,
because of the lack of full network information, we
used a truncated version of the Bonacich centrality
measure instead of the full measure in Equation (12).
Finally, although the theoretical setup suggests that
competition for attention is the driver of our results,
the data of Study 1 do not allow us to test this idea
directly. To address these concerns, we executed a
second study. First, the data in Study 2 cover 33
campaigns (versus one campaign in Study 1) with
Figure 6. Study 1: Out-of-Sample Seeding Comparison
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video content (versus an online game in Study 1), in
which the seeds broadcast to all their friends (versus
selective sharing, as in Study 1) on a different large
social network platform. Second, because we observe
the full network in Study 2, we can estimate the effect
of the untruncated Bonacich centrality measure. Fi-
nally, because we observe how many messages peo-
ple exchange in the network, we can provide em-
pirical support for the mechanism of competition
for attention.
4. Study 2: Empirical Validation Based on
Multiple Social Media Campaigns
We obtained data from a social network of under-
graduate students of a major university in the United
States (Chen et al. 2017). The data were collected
during the 2010 Super Bowl, a time when many
brands launched new advertising campaigns. During
this event, people can share these advertising cam-
paigns with their friends in their social network.
These friends may further share the campaign with
their friends, and so on. In contrast to Study 1, in
which people selectively shared the campaign with
a selected number of friends, in Study 2, people
broadcasted to all their friends. For 33 Super Bowl
campaigns, we identified seeds and the cascades that
they generated following previous research (Bakshy
et al. 2011). A seed is identified as someone who initi-
ated sharing a campaign without having received the
campaign on their own social network before. The cas-
cade initiated by the seed is then identified by following
the chain of shares of the campaign throughout the
friendship network.We observe all network connections
between individuals,which allowsus to compute the full
Bonacich centrality, as defined in Equation (12). Im-
portantly, similar to the face-to-face network of ac-
tivities studied by Iyer and Katona (2016), we also
observe howmanymessageswere exchanged between
friends on the network. These exchanges were mea-
sured over a two-month time period prior to the Super
Bowl and allow us to obtain a more direct measure of
how information competes for attention.
4.1. Network, Campaign, and Seed
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics of the undirected network, the
campaigns, and the seeds are presented in Table 4.We
observe 42,858 network members with an average
degree of 79.5 (SD = 75.4) and an average second
degree of 12,009.6 (SD = 14,653.9). We also computed
k-core centrality, a network measure that differenti-
ates the periphery of the network (low k-core) from
the inner core (high k-core) and is known as a good
predictor of reach (Kitsak et al. 2010). The average
k-core in the network is 40.5 (SD = 21.7). The network
members are on average 19.0 (SD = 1.4) years old, are
male in 55%of the cases, and aremembers of the social
network for, on average, 4.70 years (SD = 1.22). The
network has a positive degree assortativity of 0.23.
In total, we observe the spread of 33 Super Bowl
campaigns. The average number of seeds per cam-
paign is 109.6 (SD = 231.1), and the average total reach
per campaign is 13,935.4 (SD= 38,439.6). The cascades
are initiated by a total of 3,618 seeds, who obtained an
average reach of 127.1 (SD = 330.1). Although the
seeds’ average degree (67.9; SD = 66.2), average
second degree (9,908.2; SD = 12,761.3), and average
k-core (37.2, SD = 21.5) are somewhat lower than the
network averages, the seeds are very similar in terms
of their demographic characteristics: average age of
18.8 years (SD = 1.4), 53% men, and average mem-
bership duration of 4.54 years (SD = 0.97).
4.2. Model Formulation and Estimation
Different from Study 1, all seeds share the campaign
with all friends in their network. Therefore, we di-
rectly model the reach of each seed and do not model
the decision to share and with how many friends the
campaign is shared. Similar to Study 1 (Equations (17)
and (18)), we model the reach Ri of seed i as a function
of Bonacich centrality and control variables Zi using a
negative binomial regression model.
Ri ~NB µi, r
( )
, (27)
µi  exp a0 + bB A, βi
( ) + γZi).( (28)












Area under the curve 0.65 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.70
Mean absolute prediction error 4.5 3.6 5.2 3.5 3.3
Root-mean-squared prediction
error
19.0 18.8 18.5 18.6 17.7
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The parameters of interest are b and β, and we expect
b > 0 and β < 0, indicating a positive effect of the
Bonacich centrality on reach and a negatively con-
nected network. As control variables Zi, we include
age, gender, andmembership duration.We also control
for k-core (Seidman 1983), which indicates whether
seeds are located in connected regions of the network.
Kitsak et al. (2010) found that a seed’s degree cen-
trality becomes unimportant after controlling for
k-core. In contrast, Aral et al. (2013) did not find any
additional value of seeding dense network regions
compared with degree centrality. They did not, how-
ever, consider the possibility that networks may be
negatively connected. To estimate themodel, we used
maximum likelihood with 1,000 bootstrap samples to
obtain significance levels (Efron 1985).
4.3 Results
We estimated two full models. Similar to Study 1, the
first full model used the truncated Bonacich centrality
measure, as discussed in Equation (13). The second
full model used Bonacich centrality obtained from
the entire network (Equation (12)). In addition to the
two full models, we also estimated three benchmark
models. The first benchmark model only includes
control variables: k-core, age, gender, and member-
ship duration. In the second benchmark model, we
added degree centrality to the model with control
variables, which corresponds to assuming that the
connectivity parameter β is equal to zero. In the third
benchmark model, we fixed the connectivity pa-
rameter to the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix (5.268 × 10−3), which corresponds
to eigenvector centrality and assumes a positively
connected network.
Table 5 presents the estimation results of all five
models. First, benchmarkmodel 1 shows that k-core is
a significant predictor of a seed’s reach, confirming
previous research (e.g., Kitsak et al. 2010, Harush and
Barzel 2017, Lokhovand Saad 2017). The other control
variables (age, gender, and membership duration of
seeds) are not related to reach. Second, similar to Study 1,
adding degree centrality significantly improves model
fit (BIC = 35,716 versus 36,194, respectively, for a
modelwith andwithout degree centrality). As expected,
seeds with higher degree obtain a higher reach. Third,
although eigenvector centrality is positively related to
reach, the relationship is weaker than degree centrality
(BIC = 36,127), corroborating Study 1. Fourth, andmost
important, bothour fullmodels,which includeBonacich
centrality (truncated and nontruncated), fit the data
significantly better than all three benchmark models.
Interestingly, our full model with truncated Bonacich
centrality describes the data slightly better according
to BIC (35,472 versus 35,596, respectively, for the
truncated and nontruncated Bonacich centrality). More-
over, the estimated network connectivity is negative
and significant in both models, and the estimates are
very similar (β̂  −2.982× 10−3 and β̂  −2.803× 10−3,
respectively, for the model with truncated and non-
truncated Bonacich centrality). The similarity be-
tween these two estimates provides support for use of
the truncated Bonacich centrality measure, which is
likely to be useful in practice. The absolute value of
Table 4. Study 2 Descriptive Statistics
Total Mean Standard deviation
Network statistics
Number of network members 42,858
Degree 79.5 75.4
Second degree 12,009.6 14,653.9
k-Core 40.5 21.7
Age 19.0 1.4
Gender (male = 1, female = 0) 0.55 0.5
Membership duration (years) 4.70 1.22
Degree assortativity 0.23
Campaign statistics
Number of campaigns 33
Number of seeds per campaign 109.6 231.1
Total number of people reached per campaign 13,935.4 38,439.6
Seed statistics
Number of seeds 3,618
Reach 127.1 330.1
Degree 67.9 66.2
Second degree 9,908.2 12,761.3
k-Core 37.2 21.5
Age 18.8 1.4
Gender (male = 1, female = 0) 0.53 0.51
Membership duration (years) 4.54 0.97
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the connectivity parameter is bounded by the inverse
of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix
(Bonacich 1987). The absolute value of our estimated
coefficient is 0.53 times the bound of 5.268 × 10−3,
indicating an effect of real importance. Furthermore,
both models illustrate that seeds with high Bonacich
centrality obtain a higher reach. In line with Study 1,
the full model with truncated Bonacich centrality finds
a positive effect of degree (b = 0.016) and a negative
effect of second-order degree (b = −0.467 × 10−4).13
Similarly, the full model with nontruncated Bonacich
centrality finds a significantly positive effect of this
measure on reach (b = 0.010).
4.4. Generalizability: The Underlying Mechanism
and Heterogeneity
In line with Study 1, our estimation results show that
the network in Study 2 is also negatively connected
and that Bonacich centrality is a powerful predictor of
a seed’s reach. In this section, we will further explore
the generalizability of our findings. First, we dem-
onstrate that competition for attention is indeed the
underlying mechanism of our findings. Second, we
explore the heterogeneity of the connectivity parameter
across campaigns and across network members.
4.4.1. The Underlying Mechanism: Competition for
Attention. Our results imply that seeds who have
many friends butwhose friends have only few friends
are able to obtain the highest reach. Although we
explain this effect through competition for attention,
so far we have not directly shown that this is indeed
the underlying mechanism. To support the explana-
tion of competition for attention, we use the actual
number of messages exchanged in the network and
perform two separate analyses. In our first analysis,
instead of predicting reach using the seeds’ degree and
seconddegree (the truncatedBonacichmodel inTable 5),
we use the seed’s degree and the number of messages
that the seed’s friends receive. The latter serves as a
measure of the competition for the attention of the
seed’s friends. Thus, if competition for attention in-
deed drives the effect, we expect a negative effect for
the number of receivedmessages: Themoremessages
the seeds’ friends receive, the more competition there
is for their attention, and the lower are the expected
reach. Table 6 presents the results of this analysis.
Consistent with the idea of competition for attention,
we find a negative effect of the number of messages
received by the seed’s friends on reach (estimated
coefficient −0.489 × 10−3).
In our second analysis, we test competition for
attention more directly by studying the receivers in
the cascades rather than the seeds. For all 455,868
instances in which a network member receives a
campaignmessage from a friend (either from a seed or
from someone further down the cascade), we observe
whether this network member decides to share that
message further. To explain the sharing decisions,









Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
Intercept 2.020 *** 2.316 *** 2.001 *** 2.233 *** 2.327 ***
Degree 0.006 *** 0.016 ***
Second degree × 10−4 −0.467 ***
Bonacich centrality 0.010 ***
Eigenvector centrality 1.835 ***
k-Core 0.060 *** 0.042 *** 0.056 *** 0.038 *** 0.039 ***
Age −0.003 −0.006 −0.003 −0.011 −0.008
Gender −0.022 0.007 −0.018 0.022 0.014
Membership duration −0.007 −0.010 −0.051 0.013 −0.005
Network connectivity (beta) × 10−3 0 Fixed 5.268 Fixed −2.982 *** −2.803 ***
LL −18,072 −17,829 −18,035 −17,703 −17,769
BIC 36,194 35,716 36,127 35,472 35,596
Notes. Dependent variable is the reach of a seed. Sig., significance level.
***The 99% confidence interval does not contain zero.
Table 6. Study 2 Estimation Results with Number of











Notes. Dependent variable is the reach of a seed. Sig., significance level.
***The 99% confidence interval does not contain zero.
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we collected the following explanatory variables:
(1) degree of the receiver, (2) the number of messages
or posts received by the receiver in the two months
prior to the Super Bowl, (3) the number of messages
or posts sent by the receiver in the same period, and
(4) other control variables: age, gender, and mem-
bership duration. If competition for attention ex-
plains the negative connectivity of networks, the
number of messages received by a network member
should mediate the effect of degree on the sharing
decision. First, in line with these expectations, degree
and the number of messages received are positively
correlated (r = 0.69, p < 0.001). Second, we estimated
five probit models of the sharing decision of receivers.
To control for unobserved heterogeneity in sharing
probabilities, we included a random receiver effect.
Table 7 reports the results.
First, model 1 illustrates that degree is negatively
related to the sharing decision, which is in line with
a negatively connected network. Second, model 2
shows that the effect of degree centrality on the shar-
ing decision becomes insignificant after controlling for
the number of messages that the network member re-
ceived. Hence, the number of messages received fully
mediates the effect of degree, which supports our
proposed mechanism of competition for attention. In-
terestingly, if we control for the number of messages
sent by the network member, as suggested by Bakshy
et al. (2011) (model 3), the effect of degree centrality
remains significant and negative. Finally, the effect of
the number of messages received on the sharing
decision remains robust if we control for the number
of messages sent (model 4), as well as for other control
variables (model 5).
The underlying mechanism contributes to the gen-
eralizability of our findings and reduces the concerns
about selection bias (Pearl 1995).14 However, so far we
assumed a homogeneous connectivity parameter (β)
across campaigns and individuals. Next, we will
explore the heterogeneity of this parameter across
campaigns, as well as across network members.
4.4.2. Heterogeneity Across Campaigns. To further
investigate the generalizability of our findings, we
separately estimated our full model with nontruncated
Bonacich centrality for each of the 17 campaigns in
which we observed at least 20 cascades. Consistent
with our main findings reported in Table 5, we find
that the network is negatively connected for all of
these 17 campaigns. Figure 7 illustrates these results
and plots the point estimates of the connectivity
parameter β and their 95% bootstrap confidence in-
tervals for each campaign. For only 4 of 17 campaigns,
this parameter is not significant at the 5% level.
Moreover, point estimates vary between –0.003 and
–0.001 and are very similar across campaigns. Finally,
consistent with the results in Table 5, the estimated
effect of Bonacich centrality on reach is positive and
strongly significant for all campaigns. This provides
further evidence for the generalizability of our find-
ings to different campaigns and networks.
4.4.3. Heterogeneity Across Network Members. In all
previous analyses, we assumed a homogeneous con-
nectivity parameter (β) for the entire network. This is
an advantage from a managerial perspective because
it suffices to know whether β is positive or negative
to find the seeds who are able to obtain the highest
reach. However, it is possible that the connectivity
is heterogeneous across the network members. Some
people might be more negatively connected than
others—that is, there is stronger competition for their
attention—whereas some might even be positively
connected. To investigate this, we analyzed hetero-
geneity as a function of observed network charac-
teristics15 for both Studies 1 and 2 (see the online
appendix). Although we only found weak evidence
for heterogeneity as a function of age in Study 2, the
connectivity parameter was always negative and did
not vary much across age levels. These results were
also corroborated by a reduction in model fit (BIC) for
both studies, suggesting that a homogeneous con-
nectivity parameter captured the underlying process
Table 7. Probit Model for the Forwarding Decision of Receivers
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig. Estimate Sig.
Intercept −1.048 *** −1.180 *** −1.041 *** −1.180 *** 0.093
Degree × 10−5 −0.057 *** −0.012 −0.059 *** −0.013 −0.007
Number of messages received −0.010 *** −0.011 *** −0.014 ***




Standard deviation random receiver effect 0.063 0.079 0.061 0.058 0.058
Note. Sig., significance level.
***The 99% confidence interval does not contain zero.
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better and that this parameter was significantly negative
across network members with different characteristics.
In sum, the results of both studies reveal that
networks are negatively connected and that this result
generalizes across campaigns, network platforms, and
network members. Moreover, our analyses using mes-
sages exchanged between network members support
our proposed mechanism that information competes
for attention. These findings have important theoreti-
cal and managerial implications, which we discuss in
the next section.
5. Discussion
5.1. Main Findings and Implications
Online social networks are attractive platforms for the
execution of marketing campaigns. However, peo-
ple’s position in and communication behavior on
these networks will determine whether and how
marketing messages spread and to what extent they
go viral. In this paper, we have developed new the-
oretical and empirical insights into the dissemination
of information on online social networks. In partic-
ular, we provide evidence that online social networks
may be negatively connected and that different mes-
sages compete for the attention of network members.
Themore intense the competition for the attention of a
network member is, the less likely it is that this net-
work member will respond to a message received
from a friend. This insight has important implications
for seeding. More specifically, we identified that
seeding according to the Bonacich centrality with a
negative connectivity parameter β is optimal when
faced with competition for attention in the network.
Network members with many friends who, in turn,
have few other friends—so that there is little com-
petition for these friends’ attention—are able to ob-
tain the highest reach. The previous literature has
neglected the possibility of a negatively connected
network or has implicitly assumed a positively con-
nected network. In particular, Tucker (2008) and
Chen et al. (2017) concluded that eigenvector cen-
trality, a centrality measure in a positively connected
network, performs worse than degree centrality in
explaining technology adoption and information
diffusion, respectively. Our results reconfirm this find-
ing in the context of information diffusion. This is
explained by our finding that online social networks are
not positively but rather negatively connected.
Watts and Peretti (2007) suggested using “big seed
marketing” to make social media campaigns suc-
cessful in an environment where messages do not
spread easily. In their approach, large numbers of
people are randomly selected for targeting purposes.
Our theoretical and empirical results, however, show
that firms can substantially improve the reach of their
campaigns by selectively targeting customers instead
of randomly targeting them. In our research, this
resulted in an expected reach that was more than
three times as high when compared with a targeting
strategy that does not account for network structure.
When network structure is taken into account, we
show that both first- and second-order degree matter.
Apractical concern of applying the proposed strategy
of seeding network members with many friends who
themselves have few friends might be that these people
are rare in real-world networks. This is because the
friends of network members with many friends typi-
cally also havemany friends, indicating positive degree
assortativity. Thedegree assortativity in the networks of
Studies 1 and 2 are 0.04 and 0.23, respectively, numbers
that are in line with what the literature reported for
other social networks (Newman 2003, Ugander et al.
2012). Importantly, we were still able to identify ef-
fective seeds in both our empirical studies despite the
networks’ positive degree assortativity.
5.2. Future Research Directions
We have shown that competition for attention plays
an important role in information-propagation pro-
cesses and that this has strong implications for seeding
strategies. Because our results hold across many cam-
paigns involving different content, different sharing
processes, and different platforms, we expect compe-
tition for attention to be important for information
propagation on social media in general. Given the
presence of competition for attention, future research
could explore other factors that might influence its
strength, such as relational, timing, and campaign-
content factors. For example, information received
from close friends might compete less for attention
than information received from acquaintances be-
cause of the nature of the relationship. Similarly,
competition for attention might be weaker during
Figure 7. Study 2 Generalizability: Estimated Effect (Dot)
and 95% Confidence Interval (Line) of the Estimated
Network Connectivity Across 17 Campaigns
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certain times of the day or days of the week. As
richer data become available—for example, on time-
stamped interactions between friends in a social
network—future research might extend our seeding
strategy with such relational and timing informa-
tion. Campaign content may play an essential role in
breaking through the clutter and mitigating the neg-
ative impact of information overload. Although pre-
vious research has studied how to keep people engaged
whenwatching online videos (e.g., Teixeira et al. 2012),
it remains unclear which content grabs attention on
social media in the first place.
Last, it remains an open question whether com-
petition for attention is also at play in social conta-
gion processes more generally, such as new-product
adoption or opinion formation (Ugander et al. 2012).
Whereas forwarding a message is an active decision
of a single person, social contagion may happen
more passively and typically requires reinforcement
(Hosanagar et al. 2010). Such contagion processes
may also have a limited capacity problem. For ex-
ample, adoption of the product of one company can
impede adoption of products offered by competing
companies. So far this phenomenon has only been
studied by using a game-theoretic perspective (e.g.,
Borodin et al. 2010, Goyal and Kearns 2012). Com-
bining game-theoretical and empirical insights, as
our research shows, may be a promising road for
future research to study competition for attention and
contagion processes in social media research.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Equations (9) and (11)
Proof of Equation (9). The first-order conditions in Equation (8)
can be rewritten as follows:
α1N−IN x+s( )+βAT x+s( )+βs0,
IN−βAT( )x α1N− IN−βAT( )s+βs,
x x* 0( )−s+β IN−βAT( )−1s,
x x* 0( )+ β−1( )s+β2 IN−βAT( )−1ATs.
The proof of the fourth equality is as follows:
In − βAT( )−11n  1n + β In − βAT( )−1AT1n,
1n  In − βAT( )1n + βAT1n,
1n  1n − βAT1n + βAT1n,
which proves Equality (9). □
Proof of Equation (11). Note that (IN − βAT)−1  IN+∑∞
i1
βi(AT)i; hence (IN − βAT)−1AT  AT(IN − βAT)−1. Therefore,
1TNβ
2(IN − βAT)−1ATs  1TNβ2AT(IN − βAT)−1s
 sTβ2(IN − βA)−1A1N ,
which proves Equality (11). □
Appendix B. Simulation Study on the Accuracy
of the Truncated Bonacich
Centrality Measure
Bonacich centrality is defined by the following infinite sum
(Equation (12)):
B A, β
( )  A1n + βA21n + β2A31n + β3A41n +⋯.
Bonacich (1987) showed that if |β| is smaller than the inverse
of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix (A), the
higher-order terms are less important in the sum. Thus, for
sufficiently small values of |β|, most of the variation in the
Table B.1. Correlation Between Nontruncated and Truncated Bonacich Centrality
Network size (N) β as a fraction of maximum bound
Truncation order (k)
k = 2 k = 3 k = 5 k = 10
1,000 0.9 0.866 0.910 0.959 0.991
1,000 0.5 0.993 0.998 1.000 1.000
1,000 −0.5 0.992 0.997 1.000 1.000
1,000 −0.9 0.839 0.843 0.915 0.983
5,000 0.9 0.828 0.883 0.944 0.988
5,000 0.5 0.992 0.998 1.000 1.000
5,000 −0.5 0.994 0.998 1.000 1.000
5,000 −0.9 0.838 0.851 0.919 0.983
10,000 0.9 0.813 0.871 0.937 0.986
10,000 0.5 0.993 0.998 1.000 1.000
10,000 −0.5 0.995 0.998 1.000 1.000
10,000 −0.9 0.850 0.864 0.926 0.984
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Bonacich centrality measure is captured by the lower-order
terms degree (A1n) and second-order degree (A21n).
To verify the accuracy of the truncation at the second-
order degree, we ran a simulation study. We simulated
undirected networks of size N ∈{1,000; 5,000; 10,000} using
preferential attachment (Barabási and Albert 1999). In each
network, we computed the untruncated value of Bonacich
centrality (Equation (11)) and the truncated version up to
kth-order-degree friends (in our empirical application, we
use k = 2; see Equation (12)). Because |β| is bounded by the
inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the adjacencymatrix, we
set β equal to {0.9, 0.5, −0.5, −0.9} times its upper bound.
Table B.1 reports the correlation between the truncated and
the nontruncated Bonacich centralities, averaged over 100
simulated networks, for each network size N. From this
simulation, we conclude that our truncation provides an
accurate approximation of the Bonacich centralitymeasure,
even when β is close to its bound. Moreover, adding higher-
order terms (k = 3, k = 5, or k = 10) only leads to small
improvements in the accuracy of the truncatedmeasure.We











4We use the term friends to refer to all connections in the egocentric
network of an individual, which may also involve acquaintances,
colleagues, or anyone else to whom someone is connected.
5We allow the adjacency matrix to be either symmetric (undirected
networks) or asymmetric (directed networks) to maintain the gen-
eralizability of our findings, whereas our empirical studies use un-
directed networks only.
6 Following the notation of Sendiña-Nadal et. al (2016), we set the
simulation parameters as follows: penetration depth l = 1, fraction of
potential leaders p = 0.5, and each new node connecting to m = 3
existing nodes and 10 initialization nodes. This leads to a degree
assortativity of 0.20, which is realistic in real-world networks
(Newman 2003, Ugander et al. 2012).
7Element a2ij of matrix A
2 counts the number of paths of length 2
between individuals i and j and thus captures second-order con-
nections. If i and j are not directly connected (i.e., aij = 0), but have one
common friend, then a2ij  1.
8We have included a simulation study on the accuracy of the ap-
proximation in Appendix B.
9 See http://www.angrybirds.com/; accessed June 3, 2019.
10Becausewe do not observe the full network in Study 1,we could not
compute eigenvector centrality exactly. Therefore, we approximate it
by setting the connectivity parameter equal to the absolute value of
the estimated parameter in the full model. A direct comparison with
eigenvalue centrality is given in Study 2.
11Although these estimates seem small, they are economically sig-
nificant because they are multiplied by large numbers: average de-
gree of seeds =145.2 (SD = 193.7, minimum (min) = 1, maximum
(max) = 27,363) and average second degree = 252,669 (SD = 509,220,
min = 11, max = 23,496,245).
12The area under the curve (AUC) is the proportion of the unit square
that is located under the curve for each targeting strategy. The AUC
takes values between zero and one, and higher AUC values are better.
See Müller et al. (2016) for an example of AUC in big-data analytics
for information systems research.
13 Similar to Study 1, these estimates are economically significant
because they are multiplied by large numbers: average degree of
seeds = 67.9 (SD = 66.2, min = 1, max = 600) and average second
degree = 9,908.2 (SD = 12,761.3, min = 8, max = 107,102).
14 If there is a selection bias in Study 2, there would exist a missing
variable that explains both the decision to share information and the
reach of a campaign. However, as illustrated by Pearl (1995), for the
selection bias to hold, this variable should also relate to the number of
messages that friends of seeds receive after controlling for seeds’
network position and reach.
15Because we do not observe sufficient repeated observations in
sharing decisions across individuals, we are unable to estimate un-
observed heterogeneity of the connectivity parameter.
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